The Role and Evolution of Central Authorities

Paul Frijters () and Alexander F. Tieman

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: In this paper we consider the way in which authorities arise in response to the need for coordination. In a model of local interaction, an authority is understood as a self-enforcing coordination selection structure, where the threat of violence ensures compliance. Such authorities form if mutually connected individuals with sufficient combined punishment potential have signalled their willingness to form such an authority, conditional upon the willigness of others to do so. Given a specific timing of decisions, we analyse the conditions under which authorities arise and under which they evolve into a steady situation with only one or several remaining authorities.

Keywords: central authorities; evolution; local interaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B25 D62 D70 H1 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 1999-02-08
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on Compaq Deskpro / Scientific Workplace 2.5; pages: 23 ; figures: included (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Role and Evolution of Central Authorities (1999)
Working Paper: The Role and Evolution of Central Authorities (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9902002

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