Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction

Sergiu Hart ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.

Keywords: games in extensive form; games of perfect information; backward induction equilibrium; subgame-perfect equilibrium; evolutionary dynamics; evolutionary stability; mutation; selection; population games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 C6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-ind
Date: 1999-05-27, Revised 2000-03-23
Note: Type of Document - Scientific Word v2.5 (LaTeX); First
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Related works:
Journal Article: Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9905002

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