A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities

Federico Echenique ()

GE, Growth, Math methods from EconWPA

Abstract: I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities. This is a negative result because it implies that the predictive power of complementarities alone is very weak. As an application of my results I show that generic 2 X 2 games either have no pure-strategy equilibria, or are GSC.

JEL-codes: C62 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-04-23
Note: 19 pages, Acrobat .pdf
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities (2002)
Working Paper: A characterization of strategic complementarities (2001)
Working Paper: A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities (2001)
Working Paper: A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities (2001)
Journal Article: A characterization of strategic complementarities (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpge:0103001

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