The one object optimal auction and the desirability of exclusion

Paulo Klinger Monteiro, Frank Page and Benar fux Svaiter
Additional contact information
Frank Page: U. Alabama
Benar fux Svaiter: IMPA

GE, Growth, Math methods from EconWPA

Abstract: In this paper we investigate the exclusion of types in optimal auctions. We show that multidimensional types exclusion is a general phenomenon.

Keywords: optimal auction; exclusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2001-12-17
Note: Type of Document - Postscript; prepared on PC; pages: 6

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/ge/papers/0112/0112002.pdf (application/pdf)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/ge/papers/0112/0112002.ps.gz (application/postscript)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpge:0112002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in GE, Growth, Math methods from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().