J.S. Mill's Liberal Principle and Unanimity

Edward Green ()

GE, Growth, Math methods from EconWPA

Abstract: The broad concept of an individual's welfare is actually a cluster of related specific concepts that bear a ``family resemblance'' to one another. One might care about how a policy will affect people both in terms of their subjective preferences and also in terms of some notion of their objective interests. This paper provides a framework for evaluation of policies in terms of welfare criteria that combine these two considerations. Sufficient conditions are provided for such a criterion to imply the same ranking of social states as does Pareto's unanimity criterion. Sufficiency is proved via study of a community of agents with interdependent ordinal preferences.

JEL-codes: C6 D5 D9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-06-21, Revised 1994-06-22
Note: 27 pages, plain TeX
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpge:9406004

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