Equilibrium structures in vertical oligopoly

Masahiro Abiru, Babu Nahata (), Subhashis Raychaudhuri and Michael Waterson
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Masahiro Abiru: Fukuoka University, Japan
Subhashis Raychaudhuri: Fukuoka University, Japan
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Suresh Chandra Babu

General Economics and Teaching from EconWPA

Abstract: The central purpose of this paper is to examine vertical integration as an equilibrium phenomenon. We model it as integration between Cournot oligopolists in both the upstream and the downstream stages. We consider the issue of private profitability versus collective profitability and show that under several situations the equilibrium outcomes may result in a Prisoner's dilemma. The analysis is extended to consider equilibrium outcomes in a dynamic setting, where we find no integration to be a relatively common outcome.

JEL-codes: L11 C81 F49 R38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo and nep-ind
Date: 2003-06-26
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 18 ; figures: included/request from author/draw your own
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Related works:
Journal Article: Equilibrium structures in vertical oligopoly (1998)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpgt:0306010

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