Policy Assessment of the European Central Bank and the Stability and Growth Pact’s Echo of the Conventional Wisdom on Budget Management

William Ginn

International Finance from EconWPA

Abstract: This paper provides an in-depth normative analysis in two parts: 1) ECB monetary policy focusing on credibility, accountability, transparency, flexibility, and both goal and instrument independence; 2) Theoretical analysis of discrepancies of the Stability and Growth Pact rules vs. discretionary framework that is comprised of the conventional view on budget deficits and how budget deficit targeting creates a procyclical and endogenous policy.

Keywords: Central Bank Credibility; Accountability; Flexibility; Ricardian Equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F3 F4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
Date: 2004-02-22
Note: Type of Document - word doc; prepared on WinXP; to print on HP Deskjet Series; pages: 30; figures: Within Document

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpif:0402004

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