An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft

Richard J. Gilbert () and Michael L. Katz ()

Industrial Organization from EconWPA

Abstract: We analyze the central economic issues raised by U.S. v Microsoft. Network effects and economies of scale in applications programs created a barrier to entry for new operating system competitors, which the combination of Netscape Navigator and the Java programming language potentially could have lowered. Microsoft took actions to eliminate this threat to its operating system monopoly, and some of Microsoft's conduct very likely harmed consumers. While we recognize the risks of the government's proposed structural remedy of splitting Microsoft in two, we are pessimistic that a limited conduct remedy would be effective in this case.

JEL-codes: L12 L41 K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-net, nep-reg and nep-tid
Date: 2001-06-08
Note: 41 pages, Acrobat .pdf
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/io/papers/0106/0106001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: An Economist's Guide to U.S. v Microsoft (2001)
Working Paper: An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft (2001)
Working Paper: An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft (2001)
Journal Article: An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft (2001)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0106001

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