Abstract:
In this article, a condition for the optimal division’s number is presented, for a market with two cable operators who offer a network service. First, a reason is presented to justify a partial covering of the national market from the cable operators. Second, a problem of moral hazard is revealed, which is able to appear through the implementation of franchising schemes with independent divisions.
Keywords:Optimal Divisionalization; Franchising; Vertical Integration. (search for similar items in EconPapers) JEL-codes:L11L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 2003-03-30 Note: Type of Document - Tex/WordPerfect/Handwritten; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX/UNIX Sparc TeX; to print on HP/PostScript/Franciscan monk; pages: 25 ; figures: included/request from author/draw your own
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