The role of interchange fees in ATM networks

Jocelyn Donze () and Isabelle Dubec
Additional contact information
Isabelle Dubec: Gremaq

Industrial Organization from EconWPA

Abstract: We develop a model to study the deployment of shared automated teller machines (ATMs) by banks when an interchange system compensates them for processing foreign withdrawals. The interchange fee is chosen collectively by banks and it is paid by the withdrawer's bank to the ATM-owning bank. We show that a high level of interchange fee softens competition on the market for deposits but increases competition on the market for withdrawals. As the former effect dominates the latter, profits are increasing in the interchange fee. This confirms the presumption that the interchange system can be used as a collusive device by banks. The model predicts an over-provision of ATMs when the number of banks is large. The predictions of the model are shown to be valid under a wide range of assumptions including different cost structures and different pricing schemes of ATM transactions. They are also consistent with the empirical evidence concerning interchange fees and foreign fees.

Keywords: ATMs; Interchange Fees; Networks; Banks; Banking Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G2 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
Date: 2003-11-26
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on WinXP; pages: 30; figures: Yes

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/io/papers/0311/0311002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The role of interchange fees in ATM networks (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0311002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Industrial Organization from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().