Price Competition in Segmented Industries

Walter Garcia-Fontes ()

Industrial Organization from EconWPA

Abstract: Repeated interaction between duopolists in a segmented industry is considered. The industry is fragmented into two separate segments. The duopolists compete in prices and segment choice, assuming that pricing strategies are completely flexible while segment choice is irreversible. Initially the two firms are located in different segments of the market, but they can choose to extend their operation to the other segment, operating in the whole industry. It is shown that there exists an equilibrium involving segment location and collusion in prices. The equilibrium path is further restricted by the magnitude of the fixed cost of entering the other segment, and by refinements on the equilibrium concept. Finally, the implications of the irreversibility of the entry decision are analyzed.

JEL-codes: L (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993-08-05, Revised 1993-08-06
Note: 23 pages, LaTeX file, titlepage.sty , epsf.sty, 3 figures Encapsulated Postscript, uuencoded, compressed and tarred.
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Working Paper: Price Competition in Segmented Industries (1993)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:9308001

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