Experimentation and Learning with Network Effects

Arthur Fishman () and Neil Gandal
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Neil Gandal: Tel Aviv University

Industrial Organization from EconWPA

Abstract: Abtract: This paper considers learning in an imperfectly competitive setting. By allowing an opponent a ``head start," unsuccessful unilateral experimentation may jeopardize future sales and profits. We show that even in the absence of spillover and signalling effects, competition can inhibit the scope of learning, relative to a monopoly.

JEL-codes: L (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
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Related works:
Journal Article: Experimentation and learning with networks effects (1994)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:9309001

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