Sequential Auctions of Israeli Cable Television Licenses: The Morning Effect

Neil Gandal
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Neil Gandal: Tel Aviv University

Industrial Organization from EconWPA

Abstract: (In Israel, area cable television (CATV) licenses were auctioned sequentially. This paper empirically finds a ``morning" effect, that is, greater competition in later rounds of the auction. While three factors (interdependencies among neighboring licenses, interdependencies among all licenses, and cautious bidding in early rounds) likely contributed to the ``morning" effect, the evidence suggests that interdependencies among neighboring licenses were the primary cause.)

JEL-codes: L (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-02-15
Note: LateX File; Figure 1 (Map) not included. To request the figure, send E-mail to gandal@econ.tau.ac.il with your fax number.
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