Allocation of Legal Costs and Patent Litigation: A Cooperative Game Approach
Reiko Aoki and
Jin-Li Hu ()
Industrial Organization from EconWPA
We compare the bargaining power of the patentee under American and English rules of legal costs allocation. Using the Nash Bargaining Game framework, we show that litigation can be a Pareto efficient outcome. The cooperative game framework allows us to examine how the institutional and market factors influence bargaining powers of plaintiff and defendant under different rules of legal cost allocation, free from assumptions on information and sequence of moves. The American rule renders the patentee more bargaining power when the legal system favors the defendant. An increase in damage reward raises bargaining power of the plaintiff and the settlement rate.
JEL-codes: L (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Type of Document - postscript and pdf files; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on PostScript or any printer supported by Acrobat; pages: 35 ; figures: included
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:9612001
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