Strategic Trade Policy and Mode of Competition: Symmetric versus Asymmetric Information

Delia Ionascu and Kresimir Zigic
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Delia Ionascu: CERGE-EI
Kresimir Zigic: CERGE-EI

International Trade from EconWPA

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the following policy dilemma: strategic trade policy versus free trade when the domestic government is bound to intervene only after the domestic firm's strategic variable is chosen. This intervention allows the domestic firm to manipulate the domestic government and results in a socially inefficient choice of the strategic variable. However, commitment to free trade leads to forgoing the benefits from profit-shifting. Yet, from the social point of view, free trade may be optimal even under the assumption of symmetric information. Due to costly signaling, this result is reinforced in the case of asymmetric information.

Keywords: strategic trade policy; free trade; first-best versus second best policy; government's commitment; signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-06-13
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; pages: 39 ; figures: included
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