Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings, and Market Access

Joseph Francois () and Will J Martin ()

International Trade from EconWPA

Abstract: Protection unconstrained by rules often varies substantially over time. Rules-based disciplines, such as WTO tariff bindings and bindings on market access in services, constrain this variability. We examine the theoretical effects of such constraints on the expected cost of protection and offer a formalization of the concept of “market access,” emphasizing both the first and second moments of the distribution of protection. As an illustration, we provide a stylized examination of Uruguay Round bindings on wheat.

Keywords: expected costs of protection; commercial policy uncertainty; market access WTO; tariff bindings. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F17 F10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 2002-10-02
Note: Type of Document - Adobe pdf file; prepared on WindowsXP; figures: 2. Also a recent CEPR discussion paper, forthcoming EER in 2002/2003.
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/it/papers/0210/0210002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings and Market Access (2002)
Journal Article: Commercial policy variability, bindings, and market access (2004)
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