US Contingent Protection Against Honey Imports: Development Aspects and the Doha Round

Abstract: On December 10, 2001 the US Department of Commerce announced the imposition of steep antidumping duties against honey imports from Argentina and China ranging from 32.6% to 183.8%, and a countervailing duty against Argentina of 5.9%. A previous AD investigation was concluded in 1995 with a uspension “agreement” that curtailed US imports from China by around 30%. Millions of beekeepers around the world most of them poor, are making a living from honey production and for them, a free and competitive world market would strengthen their possibilities of raising their standards of living. Nevertheless, the sequential pattern of increasing and widening protectionism followed by the US, the world top importer, to include successful exporters under the effects of its contingent protection measures, sends a clear message that other countries should think twice before investing in expanding honey exports to the US.

Keywords: Antidumping; Poverty; Doha Round (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F1 F2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
Date: Written 2005-02-08
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 39
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Related works:
Working Paper: US contingent protection against honey imports: development aspects and the Doha Round (2003)
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