Labor Rents, Ajustment Costs, and the Cost of U.S. Steel Trade Restraints in the 1980s

Robert E. Scott and Robert A. Blecker ()
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Robert E. Scott: University of Maryland

International Trade from EconWPA

Abstract: Recent studies have compared labor losses in import-competing industries with the costs of protection and found that those losses are not large enough to justify trade restraints. This study develops a new technique for estimating the costs and benefits of protection and provides a complete accounting of labor losses related to imports, including labor rents, unemployment costs and labor force dropouts. We find that a small steel tariff or auction quota could have generated net welfare gains for the U.S. in the 1980s, even though actual protection through Voluntary Restraint Agreements generated net welfare losses.

Keywords: Steel industry; U.S. trade policy; labor rents; protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 J30 L61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-04-15, Revised 1996-04-25
Note: Type of Document - WordPerfect; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP; pages: 32 ; figures: included

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpit:9604001

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