Endogenous Behaviour of the Tariff Rate in a Political Economy

Hom M Pant
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Hom M Pant: University of Tasmania

International Trade from EconWPA

Abstract: How would the tariff rate in a political economy respond to changes in exogenous environment? To answer this question a bargain-theoretic approach is adopted and a tariff-endogenous general equilibrium model of a small open political economy is derived. A comparative static analysis of the model shows that the bargained tariff rate changes to compensate, at least in part, for the relative loss of the loser arising from changes in the exogenous environment - be it the domestic factor endowment or the international terms of trade

Keywords: endogenous-tariff; comparative statics; Nash bargaining games; CGE models; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-09-30, Revised 1996-10-01
Note: Type of Document - Word 7.0; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP LaserJet4; pages: 29 ; figures: included. Comments welcome!
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