The macroeconomics of social pacts

Nicola Acocella, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and Patrizio Tirelli ()
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Nicola Acocella: University of Rome I

Labor and Demography from EconWPA

Abstract: In this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions among trade unions, the central bank and the fiscal policymaker. We explicitly model trade unionsconcern for public expenditure, paving the way for an analysis of the potential gains from cooperation between the fiscal policymaker and the trade unions, i.e. the so-called corporatist or social pacts that have characterized economic policies in a number of European countries in the last few decades. We also show that central bank conservatism or administrative ceilings on public expenditure may be ineffective, as tax rates and real wage claims are strategic substitutes.

Keywords: corporatism; monetary policy; fiscal policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
Date: 2004-10-04
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 20
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Related works:
Working Paper: The macroeconomics of social pacts (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpla:0410003

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