Discrimination and job-uncertainty

Paul Frijters ()

Labor and Demography from EconWPA

Abstract: In this paper I look at the possibility of encorporating group behaviour into a model of the labour market by showing that discrimination can be the result of competition between coalitions of workers and bosses for a scarce amount of jobs. Coalitions can form either on the basis of the productivity of the individual members or on the basis of a recognisable characteristic. If the probability of correctly assessing the productivity of individual workers decreases, coalition-formation on the basis of recognisable characteristics becomes relatively more rewarding than coalition forming on the basis of productivity. I thus identify the conditions under which each individual in the endogeneously defined group actively discriminates persons with different recognisable characteristics, independent of productivity.

JEL-codes: C72 C73 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-06-05
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Related works:
Journal Article: Discrimination and job-uncertainty (1998)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpla:9706001

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