An Equilibrium Search Model with Co-Worker Discrimination

Masaru Sasaki

Labor and Demography from EconWPA

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of co-worker discrimination on wage and unemployment differentials between males and females using a search model. In the presence of asymmetric co- worker discrimination, no female-dominated firm emerges in the labor market. An increase in female participation drives up the wage offer to female workers and raises female employment Moreover, an increase in the degree of discrimination by males results in gains to them in terms of higher wages and lower unemployment but results in losses to females in terms of lower wages and higher unemployment. The benefit to males provides an explanation for the persistence of discrimination.

JEL-codes: J31 J41 J64 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ltv
Date: 1998-02-11
Note: Type of Document - WordPerfect; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP; pages: 47 ; figures: included. I thank James Albrecht, Mitsuhiro Kaneda, Ivan Pastine, Susan Vroman, and the participants in seminars at Georgetown and the Kansai Labor Economics Group for helpful comments and discussion.
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Related works:
Journal Article: An Equilibrium Search Model with Coworker Discrimination (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpla:9802001

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