Individual Decision-Making to Commit a Crime: Early Models

Roman Horvath and Eva Kolomaznikova
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Eva Kolomaznikova: Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Eva Horvathova

Law and Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: The authors provide the summary of the most important findings of the early models of economics of crime, namely the models of Becker, Ehrlich and Heineke. These models study rational individual decision-making about entering into illegal activities. Probability and siže of punishment, attitudes towards risk, gains form crime and income are the main variables which causes the results of the individual behavior. The authors also discuss weaknesses of these models such as its static nature or ignoring interactive decision-making. The relationship to the theory of optimal law enforcement is also presented.

Keywords: economics; of; crime; individual; decision-making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Date: 2002-10-11
Note: Type of Document - Word PC; pages: 18
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0210001

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