Explaining de facto judicial independence

Abstract: Judicial Independence (JI) as factually implemented varies considerably between countries. Since de iure JI is an imperfect predictor of de facto JI, a number of variables that might determine the factual level of judicial independence is theoretically discussed and empirically tested. A distinction between factors that can be influenced in the short run and those that are the result of historical development and are exempt from short-term modification is made. Ascertaining the relative relevance of these two groups of variables promises to be policy-relevant because attempts to make judiciaries more independent within governance programs might be seriously constrained by factors beyond the control of national governments and international organizations.

Keywords: Judicial independence; informal institutions; formal institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H11 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law and nep-pbe
Date: 2003-06-25
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 33; figures: included
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/le/papers/0306/0306001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Explaining de facto judicial independence (2003)
Working Paper: Explaining de facto Judicial Independence (2005)
Working Paper: Explaining de facto judicial independence (2003)
Journal Article: Explaining de facto judicial independence (2007)
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