Liability Rules and Evolutionay Dynamics

Mingli Zheng ()

Law and Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: We consider the convergence properties of behavior under a comparative negligence rule (CN) and under a rule of negligence with contributory negligence (NCN), assuming bilateral care with three care levels. Using an evolutionary model, we show that CN reduces the proportion of the population using low care more rapidly than does NCN. However NCN increases the proportion of the population using high (efficient) care more rapidly than does CN. As a result, the mean care level increases more rapidly and the mean social cost falls more rapidly under CN than under NCN.

Keywords: tort law; evolutionary game; liability rules; economic analysis of law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Date: 2003-12-10
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on win98; pages: 32. Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 157 (4) Dec 2001
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Related works:
Journal Article: Liability Rules and Evolutionary Dynamics (2001)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0312001

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