Relying on the Information of Interested--and Potentially Dishonest--Parties

Chris William Sanchirico ()

Law and Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: The paper investigates the role of evidence production in the regulation of private behavior via judicial and administrative process. It proposes a model in which the law makes the agent’s “fine” depend on the presentation of evidence whose production cost, in turn,depends on how the agent has behaved in the regulated activity. This view of evidence production has several notable implications, including that truth- finding has no direct role in deterrence, that non-falsifiable evidence, even when available, is unlikely to be the best choice for the system, and that “overdeterrence” may well be cost effective.

Keywords: Evidence production; costly signaling; primary activity approach to evidence; endogenous cost signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 D6 D7 H (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-mic
Date: 2004-03-30
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 37. Companion paper: 'Games, Information, and Evidence Production: with Application to English Legal History,' American Law and Economics Review, 2(2), 342 - 380 (2000)
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/le/papers/0403/0403001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0403001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Law and Economics from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().