Games, Information, and Evidence Production: With Application to English Legal History

Chris William Sanchirico ()

Law and Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: This paper studies the problem of how the legal system regulates activity outside the courtroom based on information supplied in court by interested and potentially dishonest parties. The supply of information is analyzed along a game-theoretic dimension: the extent to which the supplier has an interest in how the information will be used. Such analysis uncovers a basic trade-off in system design between the 'fixed costs' of hearings (e.g., the productive activity forsaken by participation) and the cost of the evidence produced therein. This trade-off helps to explain and connect several trends in the historical evolution of English civil process.

Keywords: Evidence production; costly signaling; primary activity approach to evidence; endogenous cost signaling; correlated types; history of the jury; disqualification for interest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 D6 D7 H (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-mic and nep-pbe
Date: 2004-03-30
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 38. Companion paper: 'Relying on the Information of Interested--and Potentially Dishonest--Parties,' American Law and Economics Review 3(2), 320 - 357 (2001)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0403002

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