General and Specific Legal Rules

Paul Mahoney and Chris William Sanchirico ()
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Paul Mahoney: University of Virginia School of Law

Law and Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: Legal rules may be general (that is, applicable to a broad range of situations) or specific. Adopting a custom-tailored rule for a specific activity permits the regulator to make efficient use of information about the social costs and benefits of that activity. However, the rule maker typically relies on the regulated parties for such information. The regulated parties may attempt to influence the rule maker, producing rules that reflect their private interests. We show that in some cases limiting the rule maker to a single rule for multiple activities will moderate this influence and maximize welfare.

Keywords: legal rules; general versus specific rules; lobbying; rules versus standards; simple versus complex rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 K00 K23 K20 K14 K4 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
Date: 2004-08-05
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 28
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/le/papers/0408/0408001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: General and Specific Legal Rules (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0408001

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