Is a conservative central banker a (perfect) substitute for wage coordination?

Nicola Acocella and Giovanni Di Bartolomeo ()
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Nicola Acocella: University of Rome La Sapienza

Macroeconomics from EconWPA

Abstract: In a monetary union, macroeconomic policies are strongly associated with externalities that seem to imply the need for macroeconomic policy coordination. However, if coordination is not complete, partial coordination might be unable to cope with the negative externalities arising from a decentralized policy management. This paper investigates different solutions for internalizing policy externalities. In particular, we compare wage coordination to the conservative central banker solution, which is found by recent literature able to impose wage moderation to the labor unions. We also discuss some aspects related to labor flexibility reforms as a solution for the unemployment problem.

Keywords: Conservative; central; bank; budget; constraints; wage; coordination; monetary; union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 E64 F15 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 2003-07-30
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on IBM PC; pages: 13 ; figures: included/request from author/draw your own
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/mac/papers/0307/0307011.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Is a Conservative Central Banker a (Perfect) Substitute for Wage Coordination? (2004)
Journal Article: Is a Conservative Central Banker a (Perfect) Substitute for Wage Coordination? (2004)
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