Elimination of Social Security in a Dynastic Framework

Luisa Fuster (), Ayse Imrohoroglu () and Selahattin Imrohoroglu ()

Macroeconomics from EconWPA

Abstract: In this paper we study the welfare effects of eliminating social security in a model with two sided altruism where social security provides insurance against lifetime and individual income uncertainty. Our findings indicate that households are able to shift the efficiency gains, generated through privatization of social security, across parents and children quite successfully. Contrary to a pure life-cycle setup, our framework yields significant support for even an uncompensated elimination of unfunded social security.

JEL-codes: E (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-pub
Date: 2004-02-04
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on Win2000; pages: 30
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/mac/papers/0402/0402008.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Elimination of Social Security in a Dynastic Framework (2005)
Journal Article: Elimination of Social Security in a Dynastic Framework (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0402008

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