A Crise Financeira Russa

Bruno José Marques Pinto (), Thais Machado de Matos Vilela and Ursula Silveira Monteiro de Lima
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Thais Machado de Matos Vilela: Graduate School of Economics at Fundacao Getulio Vargas EPGE/FGV
Ursula Silveira Monteiro de Lima: Graduate School of Economics at Fundacao Getulio Vargas EPGE/FGV

Macroeconomics from EconWPA

Abstract: Fundamental sources of the Russian financial crisis in 1998 are discussed. Focus is made on the time horizon of judgements concerning sustainability of the economic policy. It is argued that the macroeconomic policy pursued by the monetary authorities was not robust in a medium run, but, in the absence of external shocks was far from the crisis area, and required moderate, feasible modifications to be viable in a medium run. After the sharp deterioration in the terms of trade the previously pursued policy was no more sustainable even in a short run. The implications of the crisis were aggravated by the overly optimistic expectations by the monetary authorities of the near-term recovery in the terms of trade.

Keywords: Crise Financeira; Crise Cambial; Russia; Russa; Financial Crisis; Currency Crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-tra
Date: 2005-04-13
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 15

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0504020

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