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TINBERGEN AND THEIL MEET NASH: CONTROLLABILITY IN POLICY GAMES
Nicola Acocella ()
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo Macroeconomics from EconWPA
This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy developed by Tinbergen and Theil to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.
Keywords: Policy games; policy ineffectiveness; static controllability; Nash equilibrium existence. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 E52 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mac
Date: 2005-04-26, Revised 2005-09-06
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 9
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Downloads: (external link) http://22.214.171.124/eps/mac/papers/0504/0504036.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works: Journal Article: Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: Controllability in policy games (2006) Working Paper: Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games (2005) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0504036
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