Abstract:
This paper builds on the Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) model of deregulation. We concentrate on product market to construct a framework explaining in a more nuanced way the redistributive effects of deregulation between sectors and within the same sector, and possible oppositions to this policy by firms and workers. In a general equilibrium framework, we introduce two sectors(regulated and unregulated), heterogeneity in firms' productivity, and a…fixed cost of entry. In such a context effects of deregulation policies can be ambiguous depending on some parametric restrictions, and sometime counterproductive. As a result, deregulation policies are not always welfare improving: a deregulation action will succeed in increasing competition and reducing mark up when the economy is already partially deregulated (sufficiently high level of competition), but may achieve the opposite outcome when it is highly regulated. Additionally, we study the choice of the best policy instrument and the optimal sequencing in the use of instruments.
JEL-codes:E61L43 (search for similar items in EconPapers) New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mac and nep-reg Date: Written Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 18 View list of references