The Independent European Central Bank: Keynesian Alternatives

Abstract: In this paper, the author aims to question the assumptions underlying the economic case for the independent European Central Bank (ECB) and argues that although a European Clearing Agency (ECA) of the type Keynes envisaged for the international economy is not a panacea for the economic problems of the European Union (EU), it is, nonetheless, a better way forward and far superior to the ECB. The paper (1) outlines the theoretical basis of Keynesian monetary and financial theory; (2) aims to ascertain the extent to which credit availability is affected by the creation of an ECB and, on that basis, to offer a critical analysis of current proposals for an ECB; (3) looks closely at the case for the ECA, seen as performing a range of functions rather than having a remit defined simply in terms of strict monetary control, including a commitment to providing the necessary finance for full employment and a responsibility for ensuring that the burden of balance-of-payments adjustment falls upon both deficit and surplus countries.

JEL-codes: E (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 1999-08-12
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on IBM PC; to print on PostScript; pages: 31; figures: included
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/mac/papers/9908/9908004.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Independent European Central Bank: Keynesian Alternatives (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Macroeconomics from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().