Implementing Efficient Allocations in a Model of Financial Intermediation

Edward Green ()

Meeting papers from EconWPA

Abstract: In a finite-trader version of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model, the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism (i.e., each trader announces the type of his own ex-post preference) in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. When the model is modified by formalizing the sequential-service constraint (cf.~Wallace, 1988), the truth-telling equilibrium implements the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.

Date: 1995-06-28
Note: INCOMPLETE AND PRELIMINARY 12 pages, LaTeX.
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Related works:
Working Paper: Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation (1996)
Journal Article: Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation (2003)
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