How to Make Scientists Agree - An Evolutionary Betting Mechanism

Tilman Slembeck ()

Method and Hist of Econ Thought from EconWPA

Abstract: This paper proposes an evolutionary betting mechanism that refers to scientists' academic reputation. The mechanism provides incentives for theoretical and empirical researchers to work on joint projects, thereby producing more general findings and stylized facts that can be used in giving economic policy advice.

Keywords: methodology; evolution; betting; stylized facts; economic policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A1 B4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
Date: 2000-07-05
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 5 ; figures: none. forthcoming in KYKLOS:

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http://129.3.20.41/eps/mhet/papers/0004/0004004.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: How to Make Scientists Agree: An Evolutionary Betting Mechanism (2000)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmh:0004004

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