What will people bid when they compare values to expected price?

Leon Taylor ()

Microeconomics from EconWPA

Abstract: Suppose that the auctioneer begins at a maximum price, with every bidder knowing her own valuation of the object. Suppose that her valuation exceeds her expectation of the price. Then she might plan to bid more than some linear positive function of the valuation. Such a revision of the Vickrey strategy is most likely in a small auction, where it may affect the expected price. (JEL D44)

Keywords: auctions; bidding; valuation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-04-22
Note: Type of Document - Microsoft Word 2000; prepared on Compaq Presario PC; to print on HP; pages: 8; figures: none

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0004002

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