What Really Matters in Auction Design

Paul Klemperer ()

Microeconomics from EconWPA

Abstract: The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems (we discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles), and the Anglo-Dutch auction-a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions-may often perform better. However, everything depends on the details of the context; the circumstances of the U.K. mobile-phone license auction made an ascending format ideal. Auction design is a matter of "horses for courses", not "one size fits all".

JEL-codes: C7 D8 L (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-07-21
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat pdf; prepared on PC; to print on HP; pages: 20; figures: included
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/mic/papers/0004/0004008.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: What Really Matters in Auction Design (2000)
Journal Article: What Really Matters in Auction Design (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0004008

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