The Trust Paradox: A Survey of Economic Inquiries Into the Nature of Trust and Trustworthiness

Harvey James ()

Microeconomics from EconWPA

Abstract: This paper examines the concepts of trust and trustworthiness in the context of a one-sided variation of the prisoner's dilemma, and it evaluates four different categories of solutions to the PD problem: changing player preferences, enforcing explicit contracts, establishing implicit contracts, and repeating the interaction of the players. Because these solutions rely on the creation of incentives to induce cooperation, this paper articulates a paradox of trust in that if one trusts another because there are incentives for the other to be trustworthy, then the vulnerability to exploitation is removed which gives trust its very meaning. The paper explores the implications of trust when understood to exist at two levels -- one in which there are incentives to trust, and the other in which appropriate incentives are absent.

Keywords: Trust; social norms; transaction costs; rationality; prisoner's dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-pke
Date: 2002-02-04
Note: Type of Document - Microsoft Word; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP; pages: 28; figures: 4. Figures embedded as tables in document
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0202001

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