Equilibrium Agenda Formation

Bhaskar Dutta (), Matthew O. Jackson () and Michel Le Breton
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Michel Le Breton: University of Toulouse

Microeconomics from EconWPA

Abstract: We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined, and in fact coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas. Under voting by successive elimination (or amendment), the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several specific settings and show that studying equilibrium agendas can lead to sharp predictions, in contrast with well-known ``chaos'' theorems.

Keywords: agenda; equilibrium; voting; agenda formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Date: 2002-11-04
Note: Type of Document - pdf
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/mic/papers/0211/0211010.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: EQUILIBRIUM AGENDA FORMATION (2002)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Agenda Formation (2002)
Journal Article: Equilibrium agenda formation (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0211010

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