The Role of Auctions in Allocating Public Resources

Chris Chan, Patrick Laplagne and David Cole Appels ()
Additional contact information
Chris Chan: Productivity Commission
Patrick Laplagne: Productivity Commission

Microeconomics from EconWPA

Abstract: This paper provides an economic framework within which to consider the effectiveness and limitations of auction markets. The paper looks at the use of auctions as a policy instrument and the effects of auction design on consumer interests, the efficient allocation of resources, and industry competitiveness.

Keywords: Australia; Research; Ascending-bid auction; Auctions; Bidders; Conservation funds; Descending-bid auction; Dutch auction; English auction; Environmental Management; First-price sealed-bid auction; Infrastructure; Markets; Oral auction; Outcry auction; Pollutant emission permits; Power supply contracts; Public resources; Radio- spectrum; Second-price sealed-bid auction Spectrum licences; Vickrey auction; Water rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 D2 D3 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-com and nep-mic
Date: Written 2003-04-30
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM - PC; to print on HP;
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/mic/papers/0304/0304007.pdf (application/pdf)

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