The set of equilibria of first-price auctions

Abstract: In this note I show that pratically any increasing function is the equilibrium bidding function of a symmetric first-price auction. It is like a Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu for auctions

Keywords: first-price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 D2 D3 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: Written 2004-03-05
Note: Type of Document - Pdf file; prepared on Windows 2000; to print on hp; pages: 6; figures: none

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/mic/papers/0403/0403001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The set of equilibria of first-price auctions (2004)
Journal Article: The set of equilibria of first-price auctions (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Microeconomics from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().