Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated

Paulo Klinger Monteiro

Microeconomics from EconWPA

Abstract: In this note I prove the existence of the optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated.

Keywords: optimal auction; all-pay auction; correlated signals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 1999-01-20, Revised 1999-01-21
Note: Type of Document - Latex; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on HP; pages: 7

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/mic/papers/9901/9901003.ps.gz (application/postscript)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/mic/papers/9901/9901003.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated (1997)
Journal Article: Optimal All-pay Auction When Signals Are Correlated (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9901003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Microeconomics from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().