Abstract:
We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in the latter they are. We provide necessary conditions that increasing equilibria of contribution games and subscription games must satisfy for general distribution functions. We then characterize a symmetric equilibrium of the subscription game when valuations are uniformly distributed. Our analysis shows that there is a significant difference between the equilibrium outcomes of the two games. In fact, we show that for the contribution game, ``contributing zero'' is the only equilibrium for a general family of distributions.
Keywords:public goods; incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers) JEL-codes:D79D89H89 (search for similar items in EconPapers) New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-pbe and nep-pub Date: 1999-01-21, Revised 1999-07-06 Note: Type of Document - Postscript file; prepared on IBM PC - PC- TEX; to print on HP; pages: 19 View list of references