Vote Buying

Eddie Dekel (), Matthew O. Jackson () and Asher Wolinsky
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Asher Wolinsky: Northwestern University

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Abstract: We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties' budget constraints and voter preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters.

Keywords: vote buying; elections; campaign promises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P16 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Date: 2005-03-14
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 41
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/othr/papers/0503/0503006.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Vote Buying (2004)
Working Paper: Vote buying (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0503006

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