Election Finance Regulation in Emerging Democracies: Lessons from Canada and the U.S

Filip Palda ()

Public Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: Election finances are usually lightly regulated in emerging democracies. As these democracies mature they seek to impose campaign spending limits, limits on contributions, and disclosure laws. The present paper reviews the experience with such laws in the United States and Canada and contrasts the public interest arguments for such laws with research emerging which suggests that campaign finance law may be used to stifle electoral competition. The paper surveys major research in the field and focuses particular attention on reporting and disclosure regulations. These regulations can impose costs on new candidates which cripple their ability to compete with established candidates. The paper also highlights the potential dangers of limiting what independent citizens' groups may spend during elections.

Keywords: Campaign finance; spending limits; campaign contributions; electoral competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 K39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-pol and nep-reg
Date: 2001-11-14
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 44 ; figures: included. PDF document may be viewed or printed
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0111010

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