Improper Selection of High-Cost Producers in the Rent-Seeking Contest

Filip Palda ()

Public Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: The resources two rival businesses spend to raise their own chance of getting a unique monopoly license are a cost of rent-seeking. When those businesses differ in the costs of producing the monopoly good there is an additional cost of rent-seeking that has not been studied in the literature. If the high cost producer wins the license, the difference between his cost and the costs of his more efficient rival is a social loss from improper selection of producers by the political process. The loss becomes more severe when the ability to lobby of the inefficient producer outstrips that of the efficient producer. This may help to explain why specialized lobbying evolved. Specialized lobbying reduces the social cost from improper selection of firms by allowing efficient producers to hire expert rent-seekers and so to raise their chances of gaining monopoly concessions.

Keywords: Rent-seeking; political efficiency; deadweight loss (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-12-07
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 16; figures: included/request from author/draw your own. PDF file may be viewed or printed
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Journal Article: Improper Selection of High-Cost Producers in the Rent-Seeking Contest (2000)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0112001

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