On the Political Economy of Social Security and Public Education

Panu Poutvaara

Public Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: I analyze simultaneous voting on the wage tax rate and investment in public education using a model with three overlapping generations and ability differences inside each cohort. Wage tax revenue finances public education and social security benefits. I derive the results both for a once-and-for-all voting system with commitment and for repeated voting. My model allows demographic change and productivity growth. Even when cohorts are of the same size, the median voter may be a young uneducated citizen.

Keywords: Social security; Public education; Voting; Implicit intergenerational contract; Structure-induced equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H52 H55 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pub
Date: 2003-03-03
Note: Type of Document - Pdf; prepared on IBM PC; to print on Xerox3N1; pages: 36 ; figures: included. This is a revised version of CESifo Working Paper No. 424 (February 2001) and CEBR Discussion Paper 2002-02.
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Political Economy of Social Security and Public Education (2004)
Working Paper: On the Political Economy of Social Security and Public Education (2001)
Journal Article: On the political economy of social security and public education (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0303001

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