Why Do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity after Communism

Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann (), John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff
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Christopher Woodruff: Univeristy of California San Diego

Public Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: Our survey of private manufacturing firms finds the size of hidden ‘unofficial’ activity to be much larger in Russia and Ukraine than in Poland, Slovakia and Romania. A comparison of cross-country averages shows that managers in Russia and Ukraine face higher effective tax rates, worse bureaucratic corruption, greater incidence of mafia protection, and have less faith in the court system. Our firm-level regressions for the three Eastern European countries find that bureaucratic corruption is significantly associated with hiding output. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

JEL-codes: H26 K42 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-mic, nep-pbe and nep-tra
Date: 2003-08-25
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; pages: 26 ; figures: included
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe/papers/0308/0308004.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Why do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity After Communism (1999)
Journal Article: Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism (2000)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0308004

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