Expressive and Instrumental Voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy

Eric Crampton () and Andrew Farrant
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Andrew Farrant: George Mason University

Public Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: Brennan and Hamlin (2002) note that expressive voting still holds at the constitutional phase. The argument, when taken to its necessary conclusion, proves quite problematic for Constitutional Political Economy. Veil mechanisms following Buchanan induce expressive voting at the constitutional phase, removing the normative benefits ascribed to the hypothetical unanimity principle. If the constitution is authored by a small group and the veil is thereby removed, instrumental considerations come to bear and the authors of the constitution establish themselves as Oligarch.

Keywords: expressive voting; constitutional political economy; Leviathan (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-edu, nep-hpe, nep-pbe and nep-pol
Date: 2004-01-07
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on WinXP; pages: 25. 25 pg pdf document
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Related works:
Journal Article: Expressive and Instrumental Voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0401002

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